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“A Plague on both Your Houses?”: Risks,
Repeats and Reconsiderations of Urban
Residential Burglary
William D. Moreto, Eric L. Piza and Joel M.
Caplan
Research has shown that mapping techniques are useful in forecasting future
crime events. However, the majority of prospective mapping techniques has
focused on the event-dependent influence of instigator incidents on subse-
quent incidents and does not explicitly incorporate the risk heterogeneity of
the setting. The study here discussed is a modest attempt to address this issue
by using a two-step process: first, using risk terrain modeling, we operational-
ized the “environmental backcloth,” (the risk heterogeneity of an area) to
forecast locations of residential burglaries in the urban city of Newark, New
Jersey. Second, using the near repeat calculator, we assessed the variability
of underlying risk between different types of residential burglaries. A discus-
sion of the findings and the joint utility of these approaches is provided.
Keywords environmental criminology; spatial risk analysis; risk terrain
modeling; near repeat phenomenon; GIS
With the exception of some studies (e.g. Groff & La Vigne, 2001, 2002;
Johnson, Bowers, Birks, & Pease, 2009), the majority of prior research on
prospective residential burglary mapping has focused on “hot spots” and
William D. Moreto is a doctoral candidate at the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice. His
research interests include environmental criminology, situational crime prevention, spatiotemporal
analysis, wildlife crime, and policing. He is currently working with the Uganda Wildlife Authority to
assess law enforcement and illegal activities within protected areas in Uganda. Eric L. Piza is a
member of the Research Faculty at the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice and the
research director for Crime Analytics of the Rutgers Center on Public Security. His research focuses
on environmental criminology, problem-oriented policing, crime control technology, and the inte-
gration of academic research and police practice. Joel M. Caplan is an assistant professor at the
Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice and associate director of the Rutgers Center on Public
Security. His research focuses on spatial analysis and behavioral geography. He has professional
experience as a police officer, 911 dispatcher, and emergency medical technician. Correspondence
to: William D. Moreto, Center for Law and Justice, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University,
123 Washington Street, Newark, NJ 07102, USA. E-mail: wmoreto@andromeda.rutgers.edu
JUSTICE QUARTERLY, 2014
Vol. 31, No. 6, 1102–1126, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.754921










































incident-based maps without including the place-based factors that provide an
optimal setting for burglaries. Specifically, research has been limited in the
conceptualization and operationalization of the environmental backcloth (Bran-
tingham & Brantingham, 1993a) that is most conducive for burglaries. Hot spot
and incident-based approaches primarily address the concept of “event depen-
dency” and leave questions pertaining to varying levels of initial risk or “risk
heterogeneity” unanswered.
Research has shown that crime is not evenly distributed, tends to concen-
trate, and is stable at places over time (Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos, 2011;
Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2010; Sherman, 1995; Sherman, Gartin, &
Buerger, 1989; Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, & Yang, 2004). Arguably, such con-
centration and stability is a manifestation of the underlying variability of risk
among neighborhoods and places within neighborhoods. Heightened levels of
risk can be associated with increased opportunities for criminal acts (Caplan,
Kennedy, & Miller, 2011a). Indeed, it has been argued that measures of risk
can be used as a proxy to measure opportunities of crime (Kennedy & Van
Brunschot, 2009). In this paper, we assess whether underlying concentrations
of risk—as defined by the criminogenic environmental backcloth—is associated
with incidents of residential burglary, even when controlling for the contagion
effects related to the near repeat phenomenon. We hypothesize that micro-
level places with higher values of risk will provide more suitable opportunities
for offenders to commit burglaries and will, therefore, have more residential
burglary incidents compared to places with lower risk values. Additionally, we
hypothesize that underlying levels of risk will vary between different types of
residential burglary incidents.
The current study employs a two-part analytical approach to forecast loca-
tions of residential burglaries, including instigator1 incidents and near repeat
incidents in the urban city of Newark, New Jersey, USA. An instigator incident
refers to the initial burglary in a near repeat pairing, while the near repeat
refers to a subsequent incident that is both spatially and temporally close to
the instigator. First, risk heterogeneity was measured using the risk terrain
modeling (RTM) approach. Risk heterogeneity was conceived to be the spatial
influence of place-based characteristics of the environmental backcloth and
person-environment interactions. In other words, risk heterogeneity was
proposed as the baseline level of risk of an area; therefore, places with high
levels of risk should have more residential burglaries compared to areas of
lower risk.
Second, the near repeat calculator was used to assess whether the near
repeat phenomenon was present in Newark in 2010. When found, the baseline
level of risk for instigator and near repeat (the subsequent burglary in a near-
repeat pairing) residential burglaries was compared, and assessed to determine
whether near repeat burglary incidents were also explained by differences in
1. Other authors have referred to the initial event in a near repeat pair as “originators” as well.
We use the term “instigators” since the term appears more frequently in the literature.














































The “environmental backcloth” refers to the “elements that surround and are
part of an individual and that may be influenced by or influence his or her
criminal behavior” (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993b, p. 6). Both the physi-
cal characteristics of places (e.g. buildings, public transportation stops, etc.)
and the influence of such characteristics on the surrounding landscape based
on individual cognitive assessments and routine activities contribute to the
environmental backcloth. In other words, the environment is not merely a set-
ting or a backdrop in which criminal and non-criminal behaviors occur, but
rather a dynamic context comprised of the person-environment nexus involving
interactional feedback loops and day-to-day situations, including both criminal
and non-criminal activities.
The surrounding environment is very much a part of any criminal activ-
ity—as the environment emits cues which may or may not affect an offender’s
decision making or daily routines. For example, crime generators and attrac-
tors will invariably impact how individuals view their environment; what signals
they receive from it; and what type of behavior they believe they can partici-
pate in (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995). Additionally, the presence of par-
ticular risky facilities (Clarke & Eck, 2007) can provide criminogenic
opportunities. Other aspects like the demographic, economic, socio-cultural,
legal and spatiotemporal characteristics of an area may also be considered
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993b). Most factors that comprise the environ-
mental backcloth fit into three broad categories2: (i) physical characteristics;
(ii) demographic, socio-economic, and cultural characteristics; and (iii) person-
environment characteristics. For the specific purposes of this study, we
focused on the physical and person-environment aspects of the environmental
backcloth that influence burglary target selection.
Factors Influencing Target Selection of Residential Burglars
Target selection for residential burglary has been explained in several ways.
Numerous studies viewed it as a sequential, multi-level process typically
involving general site selection first (e.g. neighborhood) and then the selection
of a specific target (e.g. residence) (Bennett & Wright, 1984; Brown & Altman,
1981; Cromwell, Olson, & Avary, 1991; Wright & Decker, 1994). From a routine
2. These categories are not mutually exclusive and overlap can occur.










































activities perspective (Cohen & Felson, 1979), target selection most likely
occurs during the course of “everyday movement” rather than journeys under-
taken for the explicit purpose of identifying crime opportunities (Felson &
Clarke, 1998). Brantingham and Brantingham (1993b) have illustrated crime
patterns to be shaped by an offender’s specific activity nodes and the paths
traveled between them. An offender’s daily temporal behavior patterns may
constrain their level of movement, resulting in low-levels of familiarity with
areas outside of their routine travels (Ratcliffe, 2006). Recognizing such con-
straints is vital in understanding the variability in risk amongst seemingly equal
targets (Beavon, Brantingham, & Brantingham, 1994).
While the levels of target selection are categorized separately, they are not
independent from one another. Neighborhood-level characteristics will affect
individual-level decisions and behaviors and vice versa. This is especially the
case with respect to target attractiveness and spatial attractiveness (Rhodes &
Conly, 1981). Target attractiveness refers to the rewards and costs (e.g.
investments3 and risk of apprehension) associated with a particular neighbor-
hood; spatial attractiveness refers to the favorable or unfavorable spatial char-
acteristics of a neighborhood landscape from an offender’s perspective.
As argued by Bernasco (2006, p. 141), assessing neighborhood level (or
place-based) attributes for burglary is a crucial starting point in any assess-
ment of burglary since it unravels important “implicit or explicit rules regard-
ing which areas are suitable for burglary and which areas are not.” The spatial
influence of neighborhood characteristics can be divided into how places influ-
ence neighborhoods and how individuals influence neighborhoods. Place-based
influence refers to physically identifiable infrastructure while individual-based
influence refers to identifiable behavior of individuals or groups. For example,
a pawn shop is a physical structure that can be identified and measured by
land use data. On the other hand, open-air drug markets, while commonly cor-
related with certain environs (Harocopos & Hough, 2005; McCord & Ratcliffe,
2007), are primarily identifiable through the behaviors of individuals. The spa-
tial influence of neighborhood characteristics has been well founded through
spatial analyses and ethnographic offender-based research (e.g. Brantingham &
Brantingham, 1993b; Caplan, 2011; Freundschuh & Egenhofer, 1997). For
example, it has been argued that the presence of connectors, such as public
transit and major highways, facilitates the expansion of offenders’ cognitive
awareness and activity spaces for both non-criminal and criminal activities
(Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984, 1993b).
Another place relevant to residential burglary is the residence of the bur-
glars themselves. Both spatial analysis and ethnographic interviews with known
burglars have shown that they tend to offend within close proximity to their
homes or other nodes (Bennett & Wright, 1984; Bernasco, 2006; Bernasco &
Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Forrester, Chatterton, & Pease, 1988; Rengert &
3. Investment refers to the costs, tools and general requirements of “doing business” to execute
an offense for an offender (Rhodes & Conly 1981, 170).










































Wasilchick, 1985; Wright & Decker, 1994). Additionally, Kleemans (2001)
argues that residences located near burglars are not only at higher risk of an
initial burglary, but also of a repeat burglary. Most burglars offend in order to
obtain cash or products that can be easily converted into cash (Bennett &
Wright, 1984; Wright & Decker, 1994). Quick access to cash may be required in
order to sustain their drug or alcohol use (Cromwell et al., 1991; Mawby, 2001;
Wright & Decker, 1994). While some burglars may use a professional fence to
sell their stolen goods, or sell merchandise in street-level transactions, others
may use pawn shops (Wright & Decker, 1994).
Repeat Victimization and the Near Repeat Phenomenon as Indicators for
Target Selection
Realization that a disproportionate amount of victims/targets are victimized
on two or more occasions within a specific time period has spawned much
research on victimization4 and offenders (Bernasco, 2008; Farrell & Pease,
1993; Tseloni & Pease, 2003). Explanations for repeat burglaries include bur-
glars coming back to steal items left after the first incident (early repeats),
burglars coming back to steal replacement items (delayed repeats), and bur-
glars telling other burglars that a particular residence is a favorable target
(Clarke, Perkins, & Smith, 2001; Polvi, Looman, Humphries, & Pease, 1991).
On the other hand, near repeat refers to when an incident occurs to two
nearby targets within a specific period of time (Morgan, 2001; Pease, 1998;
Ratcliffe & Rengert, 2008; Short, D’Orsogna, Brantingham, & Tita, 2009). Near
repeats have received a significant amount of interest within the last decade,
resulting in fascinating research promoting prospective mapping techniques
(Bowers, Johnson, & Pease, 2004; Johnson & Bowers, 2004a, 2004b; Johnson
et al., 2007; Townsley, Homel, & Chaseling, 2000). Importantly, near repeat
research has not been limited to studying residential burglaries and has been
used to analyze shootings (Ratcliffe & Rengert, 2008; Wells, Wu, & Ye, 2012),
insurgent activities (Townsley, Johnson & Ratcliffe, 2008) and auto thefts and
robberies (Youstin, Nobles, Ward, & Cook, 2011).
As an instigator, incident needs to occur prior to a near repeat, the majority
of near repeat research has been incident-based. In other words, studies have
looked at the relationship between subsequent incidents to an earlier incident.
Some research, however, has recognized the importance of the surrounding
physical environment and spatial influence of such structures. In an attempt to
include environmental factors in their analysis, Johnson et al. (2009) utilized
an event-driven risk surface combining the structural factors of the environ-
ment. In another study, Groff and La Vigne (2001, 2002) incorporated an
opportunity raster cell surface premised solely on environmental factors that
4. See the edited text by Farrell and Pease (1993) for a comprehensive overview on repeat
victimization.










































were theoretically supported and found to be empirically related to residential
burglary.
With particular relevance to the current discussion on near repeat analysis
and the importance of the surrounding environment, Wells et al. (2012) found
that clusters of near repeat shootings differed from the concentration of over-
all shootings. A disaggregate analysis found business locations to be slightly
more likely to generate near-repeats than houses and open areas; gang-related
shootings generated higher levels of subsequent violence than other incident
types. However, none of these differences were statistically significant. Fur-
thermore, the researchers were limited to data on the gun violence incidents
themselves (e.g. location type and motivation) and lacked data on environ-
mental features of places (e.g. crime generators and attractors), comprising
the environmental backcloth of the near-repeat incidents. Despite this, it is
evident that the spatial influence of particular features of the environment
is an important component in understanding the occurrence of near repeat
incidents as well as instigator incidents.
RTM and Risk Heterogeneity
Building upon the underlying principles of hotspot mapping, environmental
criminology and problem-oriented policing, the RTM approach was recently
developed as a technical and analytical method to forecast where criminal
events are most likely to occur. Originally created to forecast shootings in
Irvington, New Jersey (Caplan et al., 2011a), the RTM approach has also been
used to successfully forecast other criminal incidents in different settings (e.g.
Caplan, Moreto, & Kennedy, 2011b; Kennedy, Caplan, & Piza, 2011). Notably,
while RTM has proven useful in forecasting criminal event locations, it also has
the added potential of measuring the risk heterogeneity of an area at the
micro-level. RTM is based on identifying, conceptualizing, and operationalizing
factors to be associated with the specific outcome variable (e.g. residential bur-
glary), and is not dependent on an instigator event to occur. RTM utilizes Geo-
graphic Information System (GIS) to attribute qualities of the real world to
places on a digitized map. It operationalizes the spatial influence of target
selection indicators (e.g. crime risk factors) to common geographic units and
then combines separate map layers together to produce “risk terrain” maps
showing the presence, absence, or intensity of all risk factors at every location
throughout the landscape. In other words, it provides an explanation as to
where both instigator and subsequent events may occur by shifting attention
from the crime events themselves to the underlying factors of the environment.
Study Objectives and Research Setting
This study had two primary objectives. First, we operationalized the
environmental backcloth for burglaries to a digital map to articulate the risk










































heterogeneity of the research setting: Newark, New Jersey, USA. We utilized
RTM methods to create a risk surface based on the spatial influence of place-
based factors related to residential burglary. Like previous studies using the
RTM approach, it was expected that residential burglaries would occur at
places with higher levels of risk.
The second objective was a two-pronged test to determine whether the
place-based risk levels (e.g. derived from the risk terrain model) influenced
the locations of instigator and near repeat incidents of residential burglary in
Newark. The first step was to use the near repeat calculator5 to ascertain
whether repeat victimization and/or near repeats occurred. The near repeat
calculator was also used to identify how many times an incident was the insti-
gator or near repeat in a near-repeat pair. If the near repeat phenomenon was
present, the next task was to map and overlay both instigator and near repeat
residential burglary incidents onto the risk terrain map and to assess the
place-based risk levels of each type of event locations. As mentioned earlier,
prior research has attributed near repeats to the heightened level of risk com-
municated by an instigator event. Our research objective was to determine
whether heightened levels of place-based risk were also present before an
instigator event occurred there.
The urban city of Newark, New Jersey was the study setting. Newark is
the largest city in New Jersey and one of the most culturally diverse cities
in the USA, both in terms of land use and population. Burglary rates are
more than double the national average rate with 1,947 compared to 716.3
burglaries per 100,000 people in 2009, respectively (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2010). The actual study area did not include areas largely
comprised of Newark Liberty Airport and the (shipping) Port of Newark.
This was done in recognition of the fact that residential burglary does not
typically occur in this area,6 and because large portions of these areas fall
within the jurisdiction of the New York/New Jersey Port authority police,
and not the Newark Police Department (who are responsible for all other
crime in the city). The chance of a “residential” burglary is highly unlikely
in an environment entirely comprised of commercial establishments, high-
ways, and industrial parcels.
5. The near repeat calculator is a free, stand-alone software application developed by Ratcliffe of
Temple University. It uses the x-, y-coordinate and date of criminal incidents (e.g. in this case, res-
idential burglaries), and assesses any statistically significant spatiotemporal patterns between all
points within a data set. Spatial and temporal bandwidths and bands are user-defined, but should
be based upon empirical research or theoretical explanations. The actual spatiotemporal patterns
found in the data set are then compared to an expected pattern if no near repeat phenomenon
were to exist using the Monte Carlo method. The near repeat calculator can be downloaded from:
http://www.temple.edu/cj/misc/nr/
6. Outside of the airport and port Newark, the only populated portion of this area is a small stretch
of highway with hotels, restaurants, and other commercial (non residential) properties. The
remainder of the area is comprised of interstate highways with no rest stops in Newark boundaries
(e.g. the New Jersey Turnpike) and vacant, inaccessible land.











































Objective 1 Methods: Operationalizing the Environmental Backcloth to
Represent Risk Heterogeneity
The first objective in the study was to operationalize the environmental back-
cloth, and articulate (with a digitized map) the risk heterogeneity of the study
area that was particularly pertinent to residential burglaries. Place-based risk
factors of burglary were selected based on the empirical research evidence
described earlier. Additionally, discussions with personnel of the Newark Police
Department’s CompStat unit provided practical experience-based justification
for the use of some other factors included in this study. As described by Ratc-
liffe and McCullagh (2001), the experience of analysts and practitioners should
be considered in order to unravel potentially relevant factors.
Initially, there were six risk factors identified for inclusion in the
study—land use parcels, at-risk housing complexes, pawn shops, burglar resi-
dences, public transportation nodes (bus stops and light rail), and drug mar-
kets. Data for this project was collected from the GIS systems of the Newark
Police Department and the City of Newark. The following layers were
extracted from the Newark Police Department’s GIS System: 2010 burglary
incidents, “at-risk” housing complexes, 2009 drug arrests, “pawn shop” loca-
tions, and residences of known burglars. On a daily basis, Newark Police per-
sonnel geocode Part 1 crimes and merge them to “year-to-date” data layers
containing all incidents previously occurring in the calendar year. Arrest data
is geocoded and updated in a similar manner.7 In addition to the aggregate
“arrest” file, separate data layers capture arrests based on the offense type;
Drug arrests data were used in this study. While criminologists have long
debated the validity of arrest as a measure of crime, numerous studies have
operationalized drug arrests as a proxy for drug markets (Caplan et al., 2011a;
Jacobson, 1999; Kennedy et al., 2011; Weisburd et al., 2006; Weisburd &
Green, 1995).
In addition to crime and offense activity, Newark’s CompStat unit maintains
GIS files of facilities of interest throughout the city, one such layer being pawn
shops. Newark only has two “pawn shops” in the traditional sense: a commer-
cial establishment that provides a monetary loan to customers who use their
personal property as collateral. However, a number of businesses purchase
7. The Newark Police Department has undertaken specific processes to ensure the accuracy of their
GIS data. The agency conducted an in-depth audit of their street centerline in 2009 for the purpose
of conducting necessary updates to the address data. GIS personnel added streets of newly built
housing complexes into the street file and conducted field visits to “unmatched” addresses to
determine whether faulty address ranges contained within the street file were preventing the inci-
dents from being mapped. In addition, the agency’s GIS “address locator” incorporates a large alias
table with over 15,000 records, which automatically corrects common errors in Newark’s address
data. These processes result in rather high geocoding rates. For example, the hit rate for the bur-
glary data used in this study was near 100%, with only 4 of 2,028 and 1 of 2,401 incidents unable to
be geocoded for the years 2010 and 2011, respectively.










































used property (e.g. jewelry and electronics) from customers, and are licensed
as “second-hand distributors of precious metal, gold, and electronics” by the
city of Newark. Since these establishments provide similar opportunities for
burglars to fence stolen merchandise as traditional pawn shops, they were con-
sidered along with the pawn shop as a singular risk layer in the study. In total,
36 facilities were included in the pawn shops layer.
Residences of known burglars are frequently updated and maintained by
the Newark Police Department. Individuals are entered into the “Known Bur-
glar” database for three reasons. Firstly, anyone who has been arrested for
committing a burglary (or has been issued a warrant for this offense) in New-
ark is entered into the database. Secondly, through a partnership with sur-
rounding police departments, the Newark Police is notified when a Newark
resident is arrested for committing a burglary in a surrounding jurisdiction.
Lastly, through a partnership with the State Parole Board, the Newark Police
is notified when parolees are released from prison to a Newark residence.
Parolees with multiple burglary convictions are entered into the known bur-
glar database.
The “at-risk” housing file is maintained by the Newark Police Department’s
Compstat unit through a partnership with the Newark Housing Authority and
various City of Newark departments. Two facility types are included in this
layer. The first is the public housing complexes under the direct control of the
Newark Housing Authority. Secondly, in recognition of previous analyses con-
ducted in Newark that have found certain privately-owned housing complexes
to contribute to crime in a similar manner as public housing (Kennedy et al.,
2011; Piza & O’Hara, 2012; Zanin, Shane, & Clarke, 2004), the at-risk housing
file also includes privately-owned complexes similar in scope to public housing
complexes. The CompStat unit in conjunction with the City of Newark License
Unit first identified all residential buildings in the city with 10 or more units.
CompStat personnel then identified all of these complexes with similar struc-
tural attributes as public housing (e.g. large buildings with single entrances,
limited automobile accessibility to the courtyard, etc.) as well as complexes
that received government subsidies for renting to low-income individuals.8
Privately owned complexes that fit both of these criteria were merged with
public housing to create the “at-risk” housing layer. The final two risk-
layers—areas of the city zoned as “residential” and public transportation
nodes—were extracted from the City of Newark’s GIS platform.
As shown in Table 1, the spatial influence of each risky feature of the
landscape was informed from prior empirical literature. It should be noted,
however, that some operationalizations were more conservative than typically
8. The CompStat unit informed us that they received this information from the City of Newark’s
Office of housing Assistance.










































found in the literature.9 Once the spatial influence of each risk factor was
operationalized (Caplan, 2011; Caplan et al., 2011a), it was mapped using
ArcGIS 10 software. The Spatial Analyst extension in ArcMap was then used to
convert these vector maps into raster map layers; each map layer had identi-
cally-sized: 145 feet by 145 feet raster cells.10 Each raster map layer was then
re-classified into dichotomous values for each cell (+1 for highest risk, 0 for
not highest risk) based upon the cell’s presence or absence within each buffer
distance of greatest operationalized risk.
Prior to generating a composite risk terrain map, negative binomial regres-
sion analysis was conducted to determine which factors should be included in
the risk terrain model. This “best fit” approach was utilized in order to identify
which risk factors were significantly related to residential burglaries in Newark
and which risk factors should be included in the final composite risk terrain
map. The unit of analysis for each negative binomial regression analysis was
145 foot by 145 foot cells that comprised the grid surface for the entire City
of Newark (N = 13,801).
To-date, prior studies using the RTM technique have used binary logistic
regression to test for predictive validity (Caplan et al., 2011a, 2011b; Kennedy
et al., 2011). However, given that some residences may be victimized repeat-
edly, the use of binary logistic regression may undercount the total number of
residential burglaries in 2010 as multiple incidents are classified as a single unit
to fulfill the requirements of running logistic regression analyses. This is even
despite the fact that there is a high frequency of cells without residential
burglaries and low frequency of cells with more than one incident11 (see
Table 2). Since burglary incidents, like most crime incidents, are distributed as
rare event counts, negative binomial regression is a more appropriate statisti-
cal test than a linear regression model (Braga & Bond, 2008). Indeed, the prob-
lems associated with treating event count variables as continuous values are
well documented (see Gardner, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1995; Osgood, 2000).
Recognizing this issue and because the dependent variable is a count-based
non-negative account of residential burglaries, Poisson and negative binomial
regression models were used to assess the predictive validity of RTM for
residential burglary incidents that occurred during 2010 in Newark. The choice
of model depends on the distribution of the count-data at hand. Poisson
regression models assume that the conditional mean and variance are equal,
which scholars have argued is rarely met in criminological datasets (MacDonald
& Lattimore, 2010). Thus, there is strong support for negative binomial
9. For example, literature on burglar residence and journey-to-crime has shown that close proxim-
ity and short journey-to-crime can be as far as one mile (see Rossmo, 2000). Using a one mile buf-
fer for each known burglar residence would “black-out” our entire study area leading to
potentially misleading results; thus, a more conservative and meaningful approach was utilized
(see Table 1).
10. This cell size was selected because it is half the median length of a Newark city block (290
feet). The average length of Newark streets was not used due to highway street segments acting as
outliers and skewing the street measurements in residential areas.
11. A consequence of the very small 145 foot by 145 foot units of analysis.
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regression models, which do not assume an equal mean and variance and par-
ticularly correct for overdispersion in the data (Osgood, 2000; Paternoster &
Brame, 1997). Following the approach of previous research (see Braga & Bond,
2008, p. 589), an exploratory Poisson regression model and accompanying
Pearson Chi-Square goodness-of-fit test were conducted to measure the distri-
bution of the data. The findings revealed that the count of 2010 burglary inci-
dents was distributed as a negative binomial process.12
In light of the w2 results, and the low frequency of cells with any incident,
negative binomial regression is considered an appropriate approach for the
analysis. In addition to addressing the potential limitation of using binary
logistic regression, the use of negative binomial regression is valuable in order
to test another statistical technique to verify RTM studies, particularly those
that rely on count data. It should be noted, however, that logistic regression




























































Notes. ⁄All buffers were converted into 145 foot 145 foot raster cells. ⁄⁄Values are unweighted.
All other values are classified as “0”.
12. Pearson Chi-Square = 20,350.29 with d.f. = 13798; p = 0.00.










































each type of analysis and that the results from both regression analyses were
similar.13
As shown in Table 3, results of negative binomial analyses suggest that at-
risk housing, burglars’ residences, drug markets, land use, and pawn shops
were significantly associated with residential burglary incidents. Conversely,
public transportation nodes were found to be statistically non-significant.
Therefore, with the exception of public transportation nodes, all the risk fac-
tors were included within the composite risk terrain map.
The recognition of contextually meaningful micro-places has increased within
the criminological literature. For example, the recent work conducted by Weis-
burd et al. (2004), Weisburd, Groff, and Yang (2009) highlight the importance
of analyzing street segments. Given the importance of micro-places, the cur-
rent study focuses upon 145 by 145 foot cell sizes, approximately half the med-
ian length of a Newark block. As the current study incorporates raster grid
cells, the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) is an issue that needs to be dis-
cussed. Akin to the ecological fallacy, whereby inferences about individuals are
made based on aggregate-level information, the MAUP can alter findings based
on varying spatial configurations and differing units of analysis (Amrhein, 1995).
Comprised of the scaling effect and the zoning (or aggregation) effect, the
MAUP can potentially impact research conclusions through the establishment of
arbitrary boundaries and the aggregating of data to such boundaries (Openshaw,
1984). While MAUP may still be an issue in the current study, we believe that
the use of a relatively small cell size may help alleviate concerns.
Once all five raster map layers were reclassified to permanent binary-valued
map layers, they were combined to form the final risk terrain map that
represented the compounded spatial influence of all risk factors—and the
criminogenic risk of each 145 foot by 145 foot place throughout the study
Table 2 Negative binomial regression: results for risk factors forecasting period 2
residential burglary incidents
Predictor variable IRR (Std. err.) 95% C.I. lower 95% C.I. upper
Land use 1.31 (.86)⁄ 1.15 1.49
At-risk housing 1.27 (.093)⁄ 1.10 1.46
Pawn shop 1.42 (.12)⁄ 1.20 1.69
Burglar residence 1.36 (.81)⁄ 1.21 1.53
Drug market 1.39 (.71)⁄ 1.26 1.53
Public transportation 1.02 (.062) .91 1.15
Note. ⁄p < .001 and ⁄⁄p < .05.
13. Logistic regression results show the odds ratio suggests that for every one unit increase of risk,
the log odds of all residential burglary increases by at least 13% (p < .001). In addition, the odds
ratios suggests that for every one unit increase of risk, the log odds of a non-instigator and non-
near repeat residential burglary increases by at least 18% (p < .001); only instigator incidents
increases by 42% (p < .001) and; only near repeat incidents increases by 38% (p < .001). These results
are all based on holding the spatial lag constant.










































setting. The Risk Terrain Toolset14 was then used to convert the final risk ter-
rain map into a vector grid of equally-sized cells (145 feet 145 feet). The
resultant vector risk terrain map was then spatially joined with all residential
burglaries in 2010 (1 January–31 December; n = 1,340; the dependent variable)
to produce a count of burglary incidents located within each cell (e.g. micro-
level place).
Residential burglary incidents were then joined by spatial location to each
respective cell (which also had a risk value—i.e. the independent vari-
able—attributed to it), and the map was clipped to the study area so that only
cells that intersected with street segments were included in the final analysis.
This was done in order to properly reflect the manner by which the crime data
was digitized. In Newark, as in other police departments, crime locations are
identified by street name and number, and subsequently geocoded to their cor-
responding location on a street shapefile. This process holds true regardless of
the actual location of occurrence (e.g. front of a property vs. back of a prop-
erty; indoors vs. outdoors, etc.). Within a GIS, cells not containing streets have
no chance of containing a crime incident given these aforementioned limita-
tions of administrative police records and the geocoding process (Caplan
et al., 2011a). Excluding cells which do not intersect streets ensure construct
validity since crime incidents were only geocoded to street center lines.
Objective 1 Results
Prior to each model being analyzed, the presence of spatial autocorrelation
was assessed. For the first objective, Moran’s I was .05 (p < .001) indicating
that spatial autocorrelation was present, so a spatial lag was needed to be
incorporated as a control. The “Risk Value” (0–5)15 was the independent vari-
able; while burglary counts were the dependent variable in negative binomial
regression. This format was the same for all subsequent tests. The results from
the negative binomial regression analysis suggests that for every one unit




Cell with more than one incident of residential
burglary
289 2.1
Cell with only one incident of residential burglary 1,051 7.6
Cell with no incidents of residential burglary 12,461 90.3
14. The Risk Terrain Toolset can be downloaded for free from: http://www.rutgerscps.org/rtm/.
15. It is important to remember that a risk-value of “0” does not mean that there is absolutely no
risk of residential burglary within that vector cell, but rather that the spatial risk associated with
risk factor(s) is not present within that vector cell.










































increase of risk, the difference in the logs of expected counts of all residential
burglary incidents is expected to change by 22% (incident rate ratio [IRR]
= 1.22; p < .001), given that the spatial lag is held constant. These results sug-
gest that the risk terrain map produced to articulate the environmental back-
cloth for residential burglary in Newark, NJ is statistically valid.
Objective 2 Methods: Assessing Levels of Risk for Instigator and Near
Repeat Residential Burglaries
The second objective was a two-pronged test. First, the near repeat calculator
was used to determine whether repeat victimization and the near repeat phe-
nomenon occurred in the study area during 2010. Based on the recommenda-
tions by Ratcliffe (2008), as well as the evidence from the literature, the
spatial bandwidth used was 300 feet (just over one Newark block); six spatial
bands were assigned. The temporal bandwidths used were 14 days and 26 tem-
poral bands.
It should be noted that one of the issues raised about the near repeat phe-
nomenon is the potential for establishing arbitrary spatial and temporal cut-
offs for what constitutes as a near repeat pairing. Recognizing the potential
limitations of user-defined spatial and temporal bandwidths, Youstin et al.
(2011) sought to identify patterns at various spatiotemporal lengths of three
different crime types: shootings, car thefts, and robberies. The researchers
found notable differences within and between the three crime types, and con-
cluded that while the near repeat phenomenon was present, each crime type
displayed its own distinct pattern that needed to be disentangled in order to
establish appropriate prevention strategies. Therefore, for proof of concept
and ground-level practicality, shorter spatial and temporal bandwidths and
bands are used for the current study.16
When the near repeat phenomenon was found, we then used the near
repeat calculator to determine which incidents in a near repeat pair was the
instigator and near repeat incident. Spatial and temporal parameters were
once again based on Ratcliffe’s recommendations as well as prior literature,
and were up to14 days, and greater than 300 feet up to and including 600 feet,
respectively. Originator and near repeat incidents were noted accordingly in
the attribute table of the original geocoded point shapefile of all residential
burglaries in the study setting.
As shown in Figure 1, instigators appear to cluster around areas with higher
levels of risk. To test whether this observation is statistically significant, insti-
gators and near repeats were extrapolated from the GIS dataset of all residen-
tial burglaries. All incidents that were “Instigators” and “Near Repeats” at
16. It should be noted that the authors also tested for longer spatial and temporal bandwidths
(e.g. one month temporal bandwidths, 12 temporal bands), which also corresponded with prior
studies (Johnson et al., 2007) and found similar results to the findings presented here.










































least once were exported as a separate shapefile (n = 173).17 Then, only those
incidents that were “Instigators” (n = 98) or “Near Repeats” (n = 91) at least
once, respectively, were exported as two separate shapefiles. To compare
instigators and near repeats to other residential burglaries, all incidents that
were neither “Instigators” nor “Near Repeats” were exported as a separate
shapefile (n = 1,167). Pearson Chi-Square goodness-of-fit tests run after explor-
atory Poisson regression models revealed that the “Instigators” and “Near
Repeats” were distributed as negative binomial processes while incidents that
were neither “Instigators” nor “Near Repeats” were distributed as a Poisson
process.18 The count models were then used to test the risk heterogeneity of
Figure 1 Risk terrain map with 2010 instigator residential burglaries (n = 98).
17. Some cells were associated with both an instigator and near repeat incident in different near
repeat pairings.
18. For Instigators: Pearson Chi-Square = 15,429.13 with d.f. = 13,798; p = 0.000. For Near Repeats:
Pearson Chi-Square = 15,831.74 with d.f. = 13,798; p = 0.000. For neither instigator nor near repeats:
Pearson Chi-Square = 12,479.42 with d.f. = 13,798; p = 1.000.










































each burglary event type (all non-instigators and non-near repeats, only
instigators, and only near repeats).
Objective 2 Results
Part I: confirmation of repeat victimization and near repeats
Both repeat victimization and near repeats were present for residential bur-
glaries in Newark in 2010. As shown in Table 4, there was a 318% (p < .001)
greater chance of the same residence being burglarized within 14 days of the
initial incident. Additionally, there was a 20% (p < .01) greater chance of resi-
dences being burglarized within 300 feet (one block) and within 14 days of an
instigator incident; 30% (p < .01) within 300 feet and within 15 to 28 days; 21%
(p < .001) within 301 to 600 feet and within 14 days; 23% (p < .05) within 601 to
900 feet; and 23% (p < .001) within 601 to 900 feet and within 14 days.19
Part II: place-based risk heterogeneity of instigators and near repeats
Since the near repeat phenomenon was found to exist in Newark during the
study period, both binary logistic regression and count (negative binomial or
Poisson) regression analyses were used to test the predictive validity of the
risk terrain model on different types of incident locations. Similar to the test
used for Objective 1, the independent variable for all four tests regarding
Objective 2 was the “Risk Value”. However, the dependent variable was based
on counts of: non-instigator/non-near repeat; instigator only; and near repeat
only. The Moran’s I value for all non-instigators/non near repeats was .04,
p < .001; only instigators was .02, p < .001; and near repeats was .02, p < .001,
indicating spatial autocorrelation and the need to include a spatial lag control
variable in the regression models. The following results are based on the
spatial lag being held constant in each individual analysis.
Referring to Table 5, the predictive validity of the risk terrain map was sta-
tistically significant for all three burglary incident types. Results of the Poisson
regression model suggest that for every one unit increase of risk, the differ-
ence in the logs of expected counts of a non-instigator and non-near repeat
residential burglary increases by at least 16% (IRR = 1.16; p < .001). Results of
negative binomial models suggest that only instigator incidents increases by
45% (IRR = 1.45; p < .001) and only near repeat incidents increases by 42%
(IRR = 1.42; p < .001). Lastly, negative binomial regression analysis was con-
ducted to determine the place-based influenced of risk values on near repeat
incident locations while controlling for the presence of instigator incidents and
a spatial lag. As shown in Table 6, risk value remains statistically significant:
19. Notably, the near repeat phenomenon was also found at greater distances and at longer time
periods; however, the authors believed that for practical purposes, the aforementioned results
would suffice for the current discussion.










































every one unit increase of risk results in a 39% increase in the difference in
the logs of expected counts of a near repeat incident occurring at that loca-
tion (IRR = 1.39; p < .05).
Discussion
Residential burglaries generally occur at micro-level places with higher values
of risk—as articulated by a risk terrain map. However, burglary incidents iden-
Table 6 Negative binomial regression: results for period 1 risk terrain forecasting
period 2 near repeat incidents
Predictor variable IRR (Std. err.) 95% C.I. lower 95% C.I. upper
Risk value 1.39 (.15)⁄ 1.13 1.71
Instigator 23.22 (9.66)⁄⁄ 10.27 52.50
Spatial lag 32.25 (56.46)⁄ 1.13 1.71
Notes. ⁄p < .01, ⁄⁄p < .001 and ⁄⁄⁄p < .05.
Table 5 Risk terrain forecasting 2010 residential burglaries with spatial lags included
as control variable⁄









Poisson 1.16 (.03)⁄⁄ 4.18 8.75
Only instigators Negative
binomial
1.45 (.15)⁄⁄ 1.18 1.78
Only near repeats Negative
binomial
1.41 (.15)⁄⁄ 1.14 1.74
Notes. ⁄Due to space constraints, spatial lags which were used as a control for all variables are not
presented; however, all spatial lags were statistically significant for all variables (p < .001). All tests
were run independently. ⁄⁄p < .001.
Table 4 Near repeat calculator, Monte Carlo analysis for repeat victimization, and
near repeats for 2010 residential burglaries⁄
Type of repeat Distance/days Observed over expected mean Sig.
Repeat victimization Same location/0–14 days 4.18 .001
Near repeat 1–300 feet/0–14 days 1.20 .01
Near repeat 1–300 feet/15–28 days 1.30 .01
Near repeat 301–600 feet/ 0–14 days 1.21 .001
Near repeat 601–900 feet/0 to 14 days 1.23 .05
Near repeat 601–900 feet/0–14 days 1.23 .001
Note. ⁄Monte Carlo Analyses were based on 1,000 iterations, which ensures that the results would
be at the highest level of reliability.










































tified as instigators and near repeats are even more likely to occur at higher
risk places than non-instigators and non-near repeats. These findings show the
combined utility of both the RTM approach and the near repeat calculator in
analyzing residential burglary in the urban city of Newark. More importantly,
this study yields evidence that analyzing the risk heterogeneity of an area
along with event-dependent assessments is useful for generating a more com-
plete understanding of a crime problem. This study highlights the underlying
environmental contexts that are present before, during, and after instigator or
near repeat incidents and that such contexts may influence whether a
residence is targeted for burglary. While the immediate area surrounding an
instigator incident may have heightened levels of risk post factum, such an
area may already have been at high levels of risk in the first place. In fact,
results suggest that instigator and near repeat events occur at places of higher
risk in comparison to non-instigator/non-near repeat incidents, and that
instigator and near repeat pairings are influenced by similar levels of risk.
As illustrated in Figure 2, burglaries that cannot be prevented and that serve
as instigator incidents (for near repeats) are most likely to attract near repeat
incidents at nearby places of high environmental risk—as opposed to micro-
level places within the expected near repeat bandwidth that have very low
risk. Stated another way, instigator burglary incidents may create a “pie” of a
certain radius, within which near repeat incidents are most likely to happen
during a certain timeframe. But within this pie, some “slices” are more likely
to have burglaries than other slices.
This study helps to answer the critical question of “Where do instigator inci-
dents occur?” Indeed, the concept of the “communicability of risk” (Bowers
et al., 2004; Johnson & Bowers, 2004a, 2004b; Townsley, Homel, & Chaseling,
2003)—which is analogous to the contagion effect of disease—does not incor-
porate determining whether the area was “sick” already, and overlooks
the underlying, latent causes of the “disease” by only addressing the symptoms
(e.g. instigators and near repeat incidents). Results presented here support the
Figure 2 Instigator incident and near repeat incident within expected near repeat
spatial bandwidth on risk terrain surface.










































idea that the underlying environment is associated with both instigator and
near repeats events. The combination of higher values of baseline risk levels
coupled with the heightened risk produced by instigator and near repeat
events provides a meaningful and actionable explanation as to why specific
places are targeted for burglaries over others.
Looking at the bigger picture, this formative approach to crime analysis rec-
ognized that “each crime has its particular chemistry” (Felson & Boba, 2010,
p. 45; emphasis added). Each burglary likely has its basic elements, com-
pounds, and reactions. Viewing criminal activity as being analogous to a chemi-
cal reaction (Felson, 2008) underscores that the potential for criminogenic
combustion (i.e. crime) is latent in any circumstance given the appropriate
formula of elements and compounds. Generally speaking, the risk factors
included in this study (e.g. proximity to pawn shops, proximity to burglar resi-
dence, etc.) can be viewed as elements that comprise an environmental com-
pound (e.g. the environmental backcloth or the risk heterogeneity of an area)
suitable for criminogenic reactions to occur. The recognition of crime in this
manner provides a potential explanation as to the formulation, continuation,
and cessation of current or ongoing crime hot spots. Essentially, the involve-
ment and actions by offenders, targets, and guardians can impact the crimino-
genic structure of an environment through feedback loops and mechanisms
(Eck, 2003) as would be the case with instigator events and the amount of sur-
veillance and enforcement utilized by the police. Such actions could be consid-
ered along the line of dosage effects, as increased suppression tactics and
guardianship would inversely impact the risk level of an area, while the pres-
ence of motivated offenders and suitable targets would inherently increase risk
levels—both of which could be operationalized as qualities of space and
included in a risk terrain model for the articulation of an environmental back-
cloth.
From a practical perspective, this study sheds light into the importance of
understanding place-based, baseline levels of risk when performing prospective
mapping for strategic policing operations. It identified specific places worthy
of attention in Newark’s anti-burglary efforts. For example, drug markets and
pawn shops may be susceptible to the common strategies of the Newark
police, particularly the disruption of narcotics-related activity through proac-
tive, street-level enforcement (Jacobson, 1999; Weisburd & Green, 1995;
Weisburd et al., 2006). Thus, officials could choose to also conduct intensive
narcotics enforcement at drug markets nearby burglary hot spots. Additionally,
the recognition of risky areas may also help in the identification of important
stakeholders that might have otherwise been overlooked (e.g. place manag-
ers), who may be directly responsible for facilitating such a risky environment
or who may have a vested interest and can be incorporated as informal guard-
ians (Felson, 1995). If risk factors (that were included in the risk terrain
model) are not mitigated effectively, then burglaries will continue to occur
and will cluster at the same places over time, creating hot spots (Johnson
et al., 2007).










































It is important to note that the study, like most others, contains limitations.
First, the urban city of Newark may not be representative of other cities, partic-
ularly those that are suburban. Indeed, as found by Bowers and Johnson (2005),
while repeat victimization tended to occur in more impoverished areas, space-
time clustering was more apparent in more affluent areas. Future research ana-
lyzing the underlying risk levels of different types of residential burglaries in dif-
ferent communities would be needed in order to determine whether the results
presented here are limited to the current study area. Studies attempting to rep-
licate the findings here in both urban and suburban communities are welcomed.
Second, the study only utilized five components to create the environmental
backcloth or the risk heterogeneity of the study area. While the factors that
were included in the study were theoretically grounded and empirically sup-
ported, it can be argued that more factors may need to be included in order
to generate a more representative environmental backcloth of an area. While
beyond the scope of the current discussion, the authors caution that particular
types of information (e.g. demographic) may be limited for the current appli-
cation due to limitations in data itself (e.g. census data collected every ten
years in the USA). Moreover, from a practical perspective, the inclusion of par-
ticular demographic variables (e.g. unemployment) may be of little use to
policing authorities since such factors may go beyond their capabilities or
resources. However, we encourage future research to incorporate demographic
data in a manner that has tangible implications for law enforcement. Stucky
and Ottensmann (2009), for example, found that the criminogenic influence of
certain land uses were heightened within disadvantaged areas. Such informa-
tion may improve upon the spatiotemporal analysis of crime.
Conclusion
This study contributed to the work of other scholars (e.g. Bowers et al., 2004;
Groff & La Vigne, 2001; Johnson & Bowers, 2004a, 2004b; Johnson et al., 2007;
Johnson et al., 2009; Townsley et al., 2003) by combining the strengths of place-
based risk assessment and incident-based crime analysis, and by joining the
information products of RTM and the near repeat calculator to produce intelli-
gence that can be used to forecast locations of residential burglaries, including
instigator and near repeat incidents. It highlights how police can seek to prevent
burglaries by allocating resources to places that are most attractive to moti-
vated offenders given certain characteristics of the environment (Weisburd,
2008), by trying to mitigate environmental risk factors at these places, and by
using unpreventable burglary incidents to anticipate the distal and temporal lim-
its of repeat victimization and near repeat events at certain high risk places.
In the longstanding debate in criminology concerning what promotes crime,
it is not enough to say that risk of burglary increases when the absolute num-
bers of burglary incidents increase throughout a jurisdiction. What is more
likely is that the risk of burglary at places that have certain criminogenic attri-










































butes is higher than other places because these locations attract motivated
offenders and are conducive to allowing burglary events to occur. Prevention
strategies addressing residential burglary, therefore, must incorporate both
the spatial and temporal patterns of recent known burglary incidents and the
environmental risks of micro-level places if it is to yield the most efficient and
actionable information for police resource allocation and prevention efforts.
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